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 An analysis of the normative/institutional level of the Croatian politics shows 
that the constitutional arrangements at the levels of the social system and the po-
litical sub-system could be labelled as democratic, while the constitutional solu-
tions that regulated the relations among major political institutions could turn out 
to be insufficient. Hence the semi-presidential system of government in the Croa-
tian wartime/transitional context provided an appropriate institutional framework 
for authoritarian regressions in the processes of political decision-making and in 
the content of political decisions.  
 The domination of the president of the state in Croatia’s political life did not 
stem solely from the existing constitutional arrangements; it also rested on a set of 
additional premises of activity: a) a decade of harmony between the president and 
the parliamentary majority; b) the charismatic/clientelist nature of the ruling party; 
c) a rather weak and suppressed opposition to the ruling party by the unconsoli-
dated opposition parties; and d) the expressive model of orientation of the actors 
in political activity. 
 Based on the above account of the institutional/political order and the activi-
ties of the major actors, it can be surmised that the democratic consolidation in 
Croatia at the beginning of 2000 was in its incipient stage. Also, the frequent and 
profound changes in the structure of the cleavageas and the electoral systems as 
well as the frequent party factioning stood in the way and slowed down the con-
solidation of the representational level of political system. Nevertheless, a certain 
level of consolidation is testified to by the four cycles of non-violent parliamen-
tary elections, the peaceful alternation of the parties in power, the contextually 
relatively low fluctuation of voters, the moderate fragmentation of the parliament, 
and the acceptance of the parliamentary rules of the game by the majority of the 
population.  
 
 Elections are among the most important political processes in the new democracies, 
the “central element” of all transitional processes (Puhle, 1997, p. 149). The first free 
elections marked the beginning of the transformation of totalitarian into democratic po-
 
* This is a modified section of the study “Democratic consolidation and electoral politics in Croatia 1990-
2000”, originally published in the anthology Kasapović, Mirjana (ed.), Hrvatska politika 1990.-2000. Izbori, 
stranke i parlament u Hrvatskoj, (Croatian politics 1990-2000. Elections, parties, and the Parliament in Cro-
atia), Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb, 2001. 
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litical system. In the former Yugoslav federation these elections practically not only 
delegitimized the old political regime but the state community as well and thus paved 
the way to the creation of an independent Croatian state. Although the Croatian elec-
tions of 1990 cannot formally be considered the founding but only the pre-founding 
democratic elections (Nohlen/Kasapović, 1996, pp. 43 ff.), they were nevertheless the 
most significant elections in recent Croatian history.  
 Generally, the elections following the pre-founding and the founding elections are 
assigned not only the usual functions they have in stable democracies but many addi-
tional functions as well. Primarily, they are expected to provide for the peaceful alter-
nation of the parties in power and to advance the stabilization and the consolidation of 
democracy. A broad scope of functions and expectations attributed to elections by the 
masses and the elites alike fostered hyperelectoralism as the most prominent feature of 
electoral politics.  
 In the first decade of the democratic transformation in Croatia, four cycles of elec-
tions for the first chamber (House of Representatives) of the parliament were held (in 
1990, 1992, 1995, and 2000). This means that its formal mandate was shortened from 
four to, on the average, two and a half years. In the same period there were also two 
electoral cycles for the second chamber (House of Counties) of the Parliament (1993 
and 1997), and three cycles of presidential elections (1993, 1997, 2000); also, one na-
tional constitutive plebiscite was held in 1991. 
 Opinions on the political significance and consequences of hyper-electoralism are 
divergent. Some authors claim they are typical and all in all positive for the first period 
of democratic transformation (Pridham, 1995, 24). It is thought that frequent elections 
facilitate and routinize peaceful alternation of power: the first such alternation is some-
times listed as the minimal, and the two alternations without any violence either from 
“above” or “below” as a significant indicator of the consolidation of a democratic re-
gime (Huntington, 1991, 266). Other authors, on the other hand, claim that hyper-elec-
toralism only obscures the realities of many post-communist countries. The elections 
serve as a means of survival and legitimation of “electoral dictatorships” and “dictato-
rial democracies” since the formal democratic practices run counter to the – directly or 
indirectly – restricted scope of elections; this results in the emergence of authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian parliamentary and presidential democracies (Juchler, 1997).  
 In the first transitional period, hyper-electoralism should be assessed contextually. If 
both the external and the internal factors foster democratic consolidation, then democ-
ratic elections may help a political system on the whole to fulfil many of its functions. 
Since, due to sweeping, rapid and uncertain changes of the systems, citizens’ political 
preferences also change relatively fast1, frequent elections make for a better link be-
tween the voters’ preferences and the political conflicts. This also creates better condi-
tions for the institutional channelling and resolution of potentially violent social and 
political conflicts. Frequent elections accelerate the political profiling and the organiza-
tional structuring of political parties as well as the recruitment of new political elites.  
 
1 See volatility in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia (Olson, 1998, 
460), and Lithuania (Krupavicius, 1998, 486). Also Tóka, 1998. 
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 The importance of elections has increased the importance of electoral systems as 
institutional forms of arranging electoral processes. Thus they are categorised as either 
key “constitutional arrangements” (Lijphart, 1991), major (Merkel, 1996) or very im-
portant political institutions of the new democracies (Flores Juberias, 1996; Noh-
len/Kasapović, 1996; Ishiyama/Velten, 1998; etc.). On the basis of a decade-long trans-
formational experience it can be concluded that certain electoral systems on the whole,2 
or their component parts or technical elements,3 are particularly favourable for the 
consolidation of certain political institutions and political regimes in general. 
 An increase in the significance of electoral systems in the eyes of political elites and 
the variety of expectations attached to them have given birth to strong institutional re-
formism as the second important feature of the electoral politics in Croatia. In ten years, 
all the central models of the electoral systems for the first chamber of the Parliament 
have been remoulded: the absolute majority system (1990), the segmented system with 
the equal ratio of direct and closed list seats (1992), the segmented system with the pre-
ponderant share of the closed list seats (1995) and the proportional representation 
(2000). 
 Comparatively, there has been no new democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 
with such frequent and radical changes of electoral systems in a mere decade. In the en-
tire transitional region there has been no country that in ten years carried out three big, 
“typological” electoral reforms (1990, 1992, 2000). No state has held absolute majority, 
plurality, and proportional representation in only ten years i.e. applied the majority, 
segmented, and proportional electoral model for the first chamber of the Parliament. In 
the most consolidated new democracies (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovenia), and in the democracies that are following in their footsteps but lagging 
behind (Slovakia, Romania), one type of electoral system has been maintained and only 
some of its structural components or technical aspects have been changed. All these 
countries adopted and implemented the proportional representation in its many varieties; 
only Hungary introduced a compensatory electoral model. In the other transitional 
countries the type of electoral system has changed only once when the majority elec-
toral system was replaced by the proportional representation (Latvia, Moldova) or a 
combined model (Albania, Lithuania, Macedonia, Russia, Ukraine); also, a combined 
model was substituted by the proportional electoral system in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.4 
 
2 “The spectrum of electoral systems that foster consolidation ranges from the proportional representation 
with electoral thresholds to the segmented or compensatory electoral systems that in a fairly balanced way 
combine the elements of proportional and majority elections” (Merkel, 1006, 47). Also, the electoral systems 
of plurality and absolute majority, and the pure proportional representation jeopardize democratic consolida-
tion (46). Herbert Kitschelt claims that the proportional representation – together with a plethora of other in-
stitutional and socio-structural factors, including more frequent elections following the collapse of a commu-
nist regime – contribute to the programmatic structuring and consequently to the democratic consolidation of 
the party systems of the post-communist countries (1995, 451-458). 
3 See the analysis of the impact of the size of constituencies (Velten/Ishiyama, 1998) and the legal elec-
toral thresholds on the character of representative bodies (Beichelt, 1998). 
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina is a special case; it has not had an autonomous electoral legislature since the 
end of the war in 1995 (see Tomić/Herceg, 1999). 
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 The intensive institutional reformism in Croatia has introduced some innovations, 
even rarities in the contemporary electoral politics. Among them: 1. the way in which 
the electoral rights of the “diaspora” have been institutionalized; 2. the legalization of 
the virile right (the right of appointment); and 3. the understanding and the structure of 
segmented electoral model. 
 The 1990 Constitution legalized the right of all Croatian citizens, regardless of their 
place of abode, to take part in the presidential and parliamentary elections i.e. the elec-
tions for the first chamber of the Parliament. This constitutional provision did not refer 
to the right of the expatriates in the usual sense of the word (the part of the electorate 
that, due to prolonged emigration lives outside the borders of Croatia) to participate in 
the Croatian parliamentary and presidential elections but only to those with the Croatian 
citizenship. So it turned out that this right was, primarily, intended for the Croatian citi-
zens residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who are one of the three constituent peoples 
of that state. Putting the fundamental political motives of such an interpretation of this 
constitutional right aside (the motives stemmed from the contradictory Croatian politics 
towards Bosnia and Herzegovina that can – particularly in its informal aspect – be la-
belled annexationist /Calic, 1996/), this represented a conspicuous deviation from the 
practice of a small number of countries that legalized the electoral rights of their dias-
pora.5  
 In the 1995 elections, the “diaspora” elected a fixed number (12) of representatives 
in a separate electoral unit and on separate electoral lists. The rationale was that that 
number of representatives – a tenth of the regular composition of the House of Repre-
sentatives – corresponded to the size of the electorate living abroad – approximately, 
one tenth of the electorate living in Croatia. However, it turned out that this was a 
somewhat fictitious electoral body since only 107,772 or 27% of the expatriate voters 
actually cast their ballots – mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thanks to such electoral 
law, they were allotted 12 seats, which markedly depreciated the voting value of a seat 
outside the country (8,981 votes) and made it three times “cheaper” than the value of a 
seat in the country (30,217 votes). Since the political dominance of HDZ among the 
Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the diaspora was indisputable, the direct political ef-
fect of that right was an increase in the absolute parliamentary HDZ majority in the 
House of Representatives: without the expatriates’ votes HDZ would have had 54.8%; 
with them it obtained 59.1% of the seats (see Kasapović, 1995). 
 Due to the protests over the motives and the effects of the institutionalization of the 
electoral rights of the “diaspora” by the Croatian opposition and the international politi-
cal public, the 1999 electoral reform modified that right. According to this new electoral 
law, the number of the representatives of the “diaspora” in the House of Representatives 
would be determined on the basis of the so-called non-fixed standard method i.e. de-
pending on the number of voters abroad participating in the Croatian elections and not 
on the size of the formal electoral body. Since the intention of this method was to level 
 
5 The political representation of the diaspora in the parliaments of other contemporary European democra-
cies such as Italian and Portuguese, does not have any substantial but only symbolic aspect. See also the ex-
amples of Columbia (Nohlen, 1993, 471-473), Angola, Guinea-Bissau, the Cape Verde Islands (Noh-
len/Krennerich/Thibaut, 1999, 68, 192, 464), and others. 
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off the value of the votes within and without the country, first the voting price of a seat 
in the country was determined; based on this, the number of representatives chosen out-
side the country was decided.6 Although this method reduced the number of the “dias-
pora” representatives to six (had the old provision remained in effect, in the 2000 elec-
tions the “diaspora” would have had the right to choose 14 representatives, the number 
elected in each of the ten constituencies in the country), the political influence of their 
mandates were not negligible at all. Together with the five representatives of ethnic mi-
norities, elected by means of special electoral rules, they “torpedoed” the absolute ma-
jority of the winning electoral coalition of SDP and HSLS (50.7%) and reduced it to 
plurality (47%) and made the formation of the majority coalition government dependent 
on other political parties. At the same time, thanks to the “diaspora” representatives, the 
HDZ (prior to its factioning) was for a time the strongest parliamentary group in the 
House of Representatives. 
 The virile right (the right of appointment) was typical for the pre-modern history of 
elections (Sternberger/Vogel, 1969; Noiret, 1990). It referred to the right of heads of 
state (monarchs, dukes, presidents, governors, etc.) to appoint to the central representa-
tive body of their states a certain number of representatives. The appointed delegates 
were called virilists.7 There are two groups of virilists: (a) ex-officio appointed 
representatives i.e. those who are appointed to this position due to their eminent status 
in the government or ecclesiastical hierarchy; and (b) the representatives appointed by 
the will of the head of state, independent of their status. The virile right has survived in 
some of its forms in the contemporary electoral/political practice, mostly of non-Euro-
pean countries (see Nohlen, 1993; Nohlen/Krennerich/Thibaut 1999). 
 The virile right was legalized in the contemporary Croatian electoral history in the 
1990 Constitution.8 According to a constitutional provision, the president had the right 
to appoint five representatives to the House of Counties. Thanks to his right of arbitrar-
ily deciding who is prominent enough to obtain a seat in this House, the then president 
seized this opportunity to increase the absolute majority of his party in the House of 
Counties. In 1993, after having appointed five representatives – either HDZ members or 
its acolytes – this party’s absolute majority (58.7%) almost turned into the two-third 
majority (61.8%). After the second elections in 1997, the president (because of interna-
 
6 First, the total number of valid ballots in Croatia (2.774.280) was divided by the total number of the 
seats available in all ten electoral units (140) in order to get the average voting price of a seat (19.816). Then 
the total number of the valid ballots in the electoral unit abroad (125.655) was divided by the average price of 
a seat in the country (19.816) to get the number of seats for this unit (6.3). Then, these 6 seats were divided 
among the electoral lists according to the D’Hondt method. All these 6 seats went to the HDZ, with more than 
90% of the foreign vote. 
7 The virile right is deeply rooted in the Croatian electoral history of the second half of the 19th century 
and the beginning of the 20th century (see Polić, 1908; Sirotković, 1967, 1981). 
8 This Constitution even envisioned the right of presidents to become representatives in the second 
chamber of the Parliament for life, after the completion of their mandate. In the first round of the 
constitutional reforms in autumn of 2000, the ruling coalition abolished the right of appointment, and in the 
second round in March 2001 it abolished the House of Counties. The reforms replaced the semi-presidential 
system of government by the parliamentary system, and the bicameral parliament with the unicameral one.  
 
Kasapović, M., Electoral Politics in Croatia ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXVII, (2000), No. 5, pp. 3–20 8 
                                                                                                                                              
tional and internal political reasons) made use of his right of appointment in a somewhat 
different manner. Together with some HDZ people he appointed two representatives of 
the Serbian ethnic community in Croatia, so that the absolute HDZ majority (65.1%) 
slightly decreased (64.7%). The then Croatian president decided on the appointment of 
these representatives completely autonomously i.e. formally, he was not obliged to con-
sult any political body or civic institution. This makes this right more exclusive in the 
Croatian legislation than, for example, in Latin American states (Nohlen, 1993). 
 The segmented electoral model was introduces in the 1992 electoral reform and 
lasted until 1999, when an electoral reform replaced it with the proportional representa-
tion. It was applied in the 1992 and 1995 elections for the upper House of the Parlia-
ment. In the inter-election period it was modified, so that the former variant differed 
from the later. 
 A segmented electoral model combines the principle of representation, the rules of 
decision-making, and the structural elements of the majority electoral system and the 
proportional. The purpose is to reconcile the fundamental goals of the majority and the 
proportional elections: the creation of a parliamentary majority capable of forming a 
stable government and the fair political representation of major political interests and 
social groups in the parliament. In order to achieve this, there are combinations of sin-
gle-member and multi-member constituencies, individual and closed-list competition, 
and the majority and the proportional rule of deciding electoral winners. The central 
structural feature of the segmented model is the system of voting with two votes: one 
for the candidates from their constituencies and the other for electoral lists in multi-
member constituencies. 
 The segmented systems are distinguished according to: 
• the type of electoral patterns which are combined (the proportional representation 
and the plurality, or the proportional representation and the absolute majority); 
• the numerical ratio of the direct and the closed list seats (the prevalence of the direct 
or the list seats, or an equal number of both); 
• the manner of combining electoral patterns (dependent or independent relationship 
between the majority and the proportional electoral pattern). 
 Central to the typologization of the segmented models is the type of the relationship 
between the majority and the proportional electoral pattern. If this relationship is en-
tirely independent i.e. if the distribution of the direct and the list seats is carried out 
separately, these are the entrenched (Nohlen/Kasapović, 1996, 32-35) or superpositional 
segmented models (Massicotte/Blais, 1999).9 The Croatian electoral model belongs to 
this type. 
 
9 Louis Massicotte and André Blais (1999) use the term “superpositional” for the independent segmented 
models in which the majority and the proportional electoral patterns are applied in the entire country (geo-
graphically homogeneous mixed system) versus the co-existential systems in which the majority system is ap-
plied in one part of the sate, and the proportional system in the other (geographically mixed system).  
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 Essential for this type of the segmented electoral model is the ratio of the direct and 
closed list seats. Since it affects the political outcomes of elections, it was radically al-
tered. While in 1992 this ratio was balanced (60:60), in 1995 the balance precariously 
tipped in favour of the closed list seats (80:28). This change suited the political interests 
of the ruling party which eschewed the risk of a head-on political confrontation with the 
united opposition in single-member districts. Thus, this change of the fundamental di-
mension of the segmented electoral model in Croatia was an expression of a change in 
the relationships among the Croatian political forces and the assessment of the ruling 
party that its advantage in relation to the opposition was not big enough to secure a suf-
ficient number of seats in the winner-take-all system. Since the opposition soon dis-
played its propensity towards the same political logic, according to which electoral sys-
tems directly depend on the transient political interests and the will of a part of political 
actors,10 the segmented electoral model proved to be not only a politically utterly 
dispensable institution but also more suitable for political engineering than the propor-
tional representation or the majority electoral systems.  
 Since the stabilization of the electoral model is thought to be one of the requirements 
for the consolidation of party systems (Beyme, 1997, 25; Hofferbert, 1998, 423; etc.), it 
is obvious that there have been no consolidation incentives from the institutional and 
representative level for the legislative and, consequently, the other levels of the political 
and social system.  
 The structuring and consolidation of political parties and party systems are mostly 
affected by electoral systems among the institutional, and by the structure of cleavages 
among the social factors.11 However, in Croatia, in the last decade, the evolution of the 
party system has primarily been affected by the structure of the social cleavages, of 
which electoral systems have been part of.  
 The party structure of the Parliament after the first free elections in 1990 primarily 
reflected the dominant cleavage between the (Yugoslav) centre and the (Croatian) pe-
riphery, manifested in the division of the bulk of the electorate into the proponents of 
the Croatian independence and the Yugoslav unionists; the latter group indiscriminately 
included the unitarists, the federalists, and the confederalists. This age-old Croatian po-
larizational pattern included the sub-polarizational ethnic cleavage between the Croatian 
majority and the Serbian minority, as well as the functional cleavage socialism/anti-so-
cialism or regime/anti-regime (Zakošek, 1991; Kasapović, 1996, 175 etc.). The territo-
 
10 On the eve of the 2000 elections, the then six leading opposition parties came up with their own pro-
posal of an electoral system. Encouraged by the apparent weakening of HDZ’s political clout and the 
strengthening of the united democratic opposition, they advocated the preservation of the segmented electoral 
model but with the altered ratio of the closed-list and the majority seats. The parties which for almost ten 
years had systematically advocated the introduction of proportional representation, now promoted the idea of 
extending the majority segment of the elections within the mixed model i.e. an increase in the number of ma-
jority votes from 28 to 40. 
11 There are other consolidating factors of the party system such as the existence of the historical party 
systems, the manner and the form of the transformational conflict, social traditions and the coalition in the 
distribution (Merkel, 1997a, 338), and the degree of the organizational modernization of politics and political 
conflicts (Puhle, 1997, 146). 
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rial and the functional dimensions of this cleavage came to light in the major 
party/political bipolarization into the Croatian, anti-socialist, rightist bloc on the one 
hand, and the pro-Yugoslav, pro-socialist, leftist bloc on the other. The major champion 
of the first bloc was the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) as the strongest opposition 
party, and the champion of the other bloc the reformed Croatian League of Communists 
(SKH), transformed after the first elections into the Social-Democratic Party (SDP). The 
domination of the polarizational pattern center/periphery used to be the central socio-
structural assumption of the two-party electoral competition and the establishment of 
the two-party parliamentary system after the first elections. This process was further fa-
cilitated by the absolute majority electoral system. In the first and the incomplete legis-
lative period from 1990 to 1992, the effective number of parliamentary parties was 2.1 
(Laakso/Taagepera, 1979; Taagepera/Shugart, 1989).  
 The traditional cleavage center/periphery disappeared together with the Croatian 
independence, while the territorial/cultural cleavage was renewed after the war in the 
new forms and with the new content (Zakošek, 1998, 47). During the war and the semi-
war of 1991-1995, the conflictual arena was mostly nontransparent, the polarizational 
patterns unclear, and the civil social, political, and ideological conflicts suppressed. The 
wartime homogenization contributed to the annihilation of the political and the ideo-
logical identity and the rallying of most voters around the party in power. After the par-
liamentary elections of 1992 and 1995, the party system was closest to the dominant-
party system. In structuring such a system, electoral models did not play a secondary 
role. The plurality elections within a segmented model were the chief institutional 
means of promoting HDZ into the dominant party. This was also facilitated by the 
weakness of the opposition parties and their inability to respond appropriately to the in-
stitutional challenges in elections by forming the “bloc” coalitions as an expression of 
the state of emergency in the country and the nature of the party system. 
 The outlines of the new multiple conflicting arena began to emerge at the end of the 
war and immediately after it. Besides the territorial/cultural cleavage, there surfaced the 
ideological/cultural (traditionalism-modernism) 12, and the socio-economic cleavage (la-
bour-management).  
 Two key conclusions ensue from what has been said. The first is that the frequent 
and profound changes in the structure of the cleavages and the electoral systems hin-
dered and slowed down the consolidation of the representational level of the political 
system. The second is that the outlined structure of the cleavages affected the consoli-
dation of the political parties and the party system to a larger extent than the electoral 
models. It was responsible for the poor support base of the parties in the society, since 
the changes in the polarizational patterns meant that the parties changed and lost their 
traditional social strongholds. The changes in the polarizational patterns fomented party 
factioning.  
 No major Croatian party has avoided some serious factioning in the last ten years. 
The first big wave of factioning after the collapse of the communist regime and the dis-
 
12 This split corresponds, basically, to the cultural cleavage of traditionalism-westernization (Markus, 
1997, 14, 18, etc.). 
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integration of Yugoslavia almost ruined the successor SDP. First, it split along the re-
gime/anti-regime line, and then along the Croatian/Serbian ethnic line. The ruling HDZ 
split in 1994 due to the intra-party bickering regarding the policy towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. (Some Croatian political scientists define this as a separate dimension of 
the center/periphery cleavage /Zakošek, 1998/). In 1997, HSLS divided into two liberal 
parties mostly along the polarizational line modernism/traditionalism. HSS factioned 
throughout the decade in a mild form along different polarizational lines. HSP, the larg-
est party of the Croatian radical right split several times and fused again with its factions 
due to the internal ideological polarizations, including the long-lasting polarization fas-
cism/anti-fascism. The strongest Croatian regional party (IDS) split along the cen-
ter/periphery line; its centrist faction broke off (see Malenica, 1996). 
 This factioning for a time led to an increase in the nominal number of parliamentary 
parties and, consequently, to an increase in the formal degree of the parliament frag-
mentation. Since the newly created parties differed ideologically, the party factioning 
increased the degree of the Parliament’s ideological polarization. The rightist parliament 
bloc included those party factions and prominent representatives who were only “semi-
loyal” to democracy. On the whole, however, the party factions did not last long and 
were not able to make their political presence felt. The Croatian politics proved the 
“rule” according to which factions harm the parent party only in the short run, while in 
the long run such behaviour proves fatal for the factions themselves. 
 Despite unfavourable institutional and socio-structural conditions, some formal 
measures of the degree of the consolidation of the Croatian party system are surpris-
ingly propitious. 
 First, the average net-volatility13 was relatively low; in the period 1990-1995 it was 
17.4, lower than in the post-communist democracies that are democratically more con-
solidated than Croatia (Olson, 1998, 460; Krupavicius, 1998, 486; Anderson, 1998, 
579). The effective number of parties in the parliament was very low, 2.1 (1990), 1.9 
(1992), 2.7 (1995), and 4.8 (2000). The formal transition from the two-party system and 
the dominant party system to a moderate pluralist system was primarily made possible 
by the introduction of the proportional representation for the 2000 elections. From 1990 
to 1997, the degree of the ideological polarization in the Parliament systematically de-
creased due to the shift of SDP towards centre-left, and the shifts of other major oppo-
sition parties either towards center-left or center-right. 
 The slow consolidation of the party system and, consequently, the entire representa-
tional system, were affected by the shifting structure of the cleavages, the constant 
changes of the institutional rules of electoral competition and the frequent party fac-
tioning. The proof of the existence of a degree of the consolidation of the Croatian party 
system is the fact that there have been four cycles of non-violent parliamentary elec-
 
13 Net-volatility expresses voting losses and gains of political parties between two electoral cycles and is 
considered indicative of the “surface stability” of the relations between voters and political parties. On the 
other hand, gross-volatility expresses voters’ tendencies to vote for different parties in different elections and 
is considered indicative of a deeper structure of the stability of the relations between voters and political par-
ties (Lane/Ersson, 1997, 179-180). 
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tions, the peaceful alternation of the parties in power, the contextually low volatility of 
voters, the moderate parliamentary fragmentation, and the acceptance of the parliamen-
tary rules of the game by the majority of the population (Kasapović, 1998, 120). 14 
 
  List of Party Names 
ASH  Action of Social Democrats of Croatia (formerly SSH) 
DA  Dalmatian Action 
HDS  Croatian Democratic Party 
HDZ  Croatian Democratic Union 
HKDS Croatian Christian Democratic Party 
HKDU Croatian Christian Democratic Union 
HND  Croatian Independent Democrats 
HNS  Croatian People's Party 
HSLS  Croatian Social Liberal Party 
HSP Croatian Party of Rights  
HSS Croatian Peasants' Party 
IDS  Istrian Democratic Assembly 
KNS  Coalition of National Agreement (HSLS, HDS, HKDS, SDH) 
LS  Liberal Party 
PGS  Alliance of Primorje and Gorski kotar (former RDS) 
RDS Democratic Union of Rijeka 
SBHS  Slavonian Baranian Croatian Party 
SDH  Social-Democratic Party of Croatia 
SDP Social-Democratic Party (former SKH-SDP) 
SDS  Serbian Democratic Party 
SDSS Independent Democratic Serbian Party 
SKH-SDP  League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Changes 
SNS  Serbian People's Party 
SSH  Socialist Party of Croatia 
 
14 Beyme lists six criteria of the consolidation of a party system: the minimalization of extremism and 
violence, the clear structure of the cleavages, the separation of the territorial and functional representation, the 
reduction of the voters’ fluctuation, and the ability to form coalitions. “No country in Eastern Europe satisfies 
all six criteria of consolidation”. (Hungary and the Czech Republic are nearest to that /1997, 52/). These are at 
the same time the criteria of the consolidation of parliamentary systems. The additional criteria are: two elec-
toral cycles without violence from above or below, the acceptance of the alternation of power and the inter-
nalization of the rules of the parliamentary system game by the majority of the population as “the only game 
in town” (Beyme, 1999, 299). 
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absolute majority; 2nd round 
plurality among candidates with 
more than 7% votes 
7 2.1 73.6 




plurality    










threshold of 3%; D’Hondt 9 1.9 88.7 





   









threshold of 5% for single 
parties, 8% for 2-parties elect. 
coalitions, 11% for 3 or more 
parties elect. coalitions; 
D’Hondt 










threshold of 5%; D’Hondt 11 4.8 84.4 
* The table was basically made according to the methodology from: Rose, R. (ed.), 2000: International Encyclopedia of Elections. 
** The number of seats in the first chamber of the parliament: the Social-political Council 1990-1992 and the House of Representatives 1992-2000, minus the 
representatives of the “diaspora” and the ethnic minorities who had been elected by means of special electoral rules (1992, 1995, 2000). 
*** The nominal and the effective number of parties refer only to those parties that obtained seats in the elections for the regular make-up of the House, and not to 
the parties of ethnic minorities that got into the House due to special electoral rules.  
**** Rose’s proportionality index for 1992 and 1995 refers solely to the proportional segment of elections. 
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Table 2: Election Results to the first chamber of the Croatian Parliament 1990-2000 
Year 1990 1992 1995 2000 
Electorate 3,528,579 3,558,913 3,634,233 3,686,378 
Ballots cast 84.47 75.61 68.79 76.53 
Invalid votes 3.89 2.21 3.31 1.66 
Valid votes 96.11 97.79 96.69 98.34 
Political parties in percent 
HDZ 41.93 44.71 45.23 24.38 
SKH-SDP, SSH 34.97       
KNS 15.34       
independents 4.12       
SDS 1.62       
HSLS   17.72 11.55   
HSLS-SDP (PGS, SBHS)       40.84 
HNS-HSS-LS (ASH, IDS)       15.55 
HSP   7.07 5.01   
HKDU-HSP       5.28 
HNS   6.70     
SDP   5.53 8.93   
HSS   4.25     
DA-IDS-RDS   3.18     
DA       0.23 
HSS-IDS-HNS-HKDU-SBHS     18.26   
ASH     1.67   
HND     3.00 0.25 
SNS   0.11   0.54 
others 2.04 9.77 6.35 13.95 
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Table 3: Composition of the first chamber of the Croatian Parliament 1990-2000 
Year 1990  1992  1995  2000  
  seats % seats % seats % seats % 
total representatives 80 100 138 100 127 100 151 100 
Political parties         
HDZ 55 68.75 85 61.59 75 59.06 46 30.46 
SKH-SDP, SSH 20 25       
KNS 3 3.75       
independents 1 1.25 5 3.62 4 3.15 3 1.99 
SDS 1 1.25       
HSLS   14 10.14 12 9.45 24 15.89 
SDP   11 7.97 10 7.87 44 29.14 
HNS   6 4.35 2 1.57 2 1.32 
DA-IDS-RDS   6 4.35     
HSP   5 3.62 4 3.15 4 2.65 
HSS   3 2.17 10 7.87 17 11.26 
SNS   3 2.17 2 1.57 1 0.66 
IDS     4 3.15 4 2.65 
HND     1 0.79   
HKDU     1 0.79 1 0.66 
ASH     1 0.79   
SBHS     1 0.79 1 0.66 
LS       2 1.32 
PGS       2 1.32 
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